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WEB WORD WAR (WWW): A NEW APPROACH TO
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
CLAIMS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT IN BROOKFIELD
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. WEST COAST
ENTERTAINMENT CORP.
More than one company has recently learned a hard les-
son about trademarks on the Internet: it is the electronic
equivalent of the Wild West.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Caused by a growth of use, Internet-related issues have recently
begun to infiltrate the courts. 2 Case law in this area is still develop-
ing as courts realize that a straightforward, traditional application
of statutes and precedent is no longer appropriate.3 As increasing
numbers of avid Internet users apply commercial and advertising
practices to the World Wide Web ("Web"), this area of law should
continue to develop at an exponential rate. 4 Judicial presence in
1. Andr6 Brunel, Billions Registered, But No Rules: The Scope of Trademark Protec-
tion for Internet Domain Names, 7 No. 3J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, 2 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. EPIX Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1112
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1161 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2000) (remanding for
trial to consider infringement claims by trademark holder against World Wide
Web site owner of same name); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp.
2d 117, 138 (D. Mass. 1999) (granting summary judgment for defendant because
domain name did not cause trademark infringement); Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp.
2d 558, 562 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that trademark owner could seek transfer or
cancellation of infringing domain name as relief for infringement); Playboy En-
ters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1090 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (denying preliminary injunction by trademark owner against domain name
user). For a discussion of domain names, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
3. See Glenn Mitchell & Craig S. Mende, Internet Links Raise Issues of Trademark,
Other Liability, N.Y. L.J., May 17, 1999, at S9 (stating that law relating to trademarks
and metatags must evolve as courts attempt to apply accepted concepts to new
technology); see also Marshall Leaffer, Domain Names, Globalization, and Internet Gov-
ernance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 148 (1998) (noting that traditional
trademark law provides little relief against third party appropriation of trademarks
via domain names).
4. See Stephen W. Feingold, Trademarks: Means to Avoid Confusion, or Property
Rights, Two Pending Cases Outline Dilemma, N.Y. L.J., July 26, 1999, at S2 (mention-
ing trademark owners' on-going battle to define parameters of acceptable business
practices on the Web); see also Sally M. Abel, Reading the Tea Leaves: Drawing the
Policing Line in Cyberspace, in UNDERSTANDING BAsIC TRADEMARK LAw 1999, at 349
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series
No. 569, 1999) (noting increased body of case law regarding trademark disputes
on Web); Timothy Wu, Essay, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv.
(363)
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the entertainment industry has begun to focus on trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition claims on the Web 5 under the
Federal Trademark Act of 1946, popularly known as the Lanham
Act.
6
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp.,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed claims of trademark infringement by a communications
company against a nationwide video rental store chain. This appeal
by the plaintiff engaged the Ninth Circuit in a comprehensive and
innovative application of traditional trademark law to domain
names and metatags. 8 The decision served as a warning to all trade-
mark registrants, especially those in the entertainment industry, to
choose marks wisely, while keeping in mind the limitations of the
Web. 9
1163, 1194 (1999) ("[Wlithout terrible fuss, courts in this country and elsewhere
have proved neither incapable of nor shy in deciding Internet cases.").
5. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (denying preliminary injunction for alleged infringement in metatags of
Web page); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 1276, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying preliminary injunction to owners of
"OSCAR" and "ACADEMY AWARDS" trademarks).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1996)).
This Note focuses on two particular sections of the Lanham Act, namely sections
32(1) and 43(a). Section 32(1), codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1114, discusses trademark
infringement for registered trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (protecting trade-
marks that have been registered through the Patent and Trademark Office). Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), mandates
trademark infringement claims for unregistered trademarks as well as those for
unfair competition. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (protecting unregistered trademarks).
For a discussion of these statutory provisions, see infra notes 3944 and accompany-
ing text.
7. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
8. See id. at 1061-62 (altering traditional likelihood of confusion test in
metatag context); see also Andrew S. Mansfield & James P. Jenal, 'Brookfield' Sets
Standards on Domain Name Rights: 9th [sic] Circuit Made Key Rulings on Intent to Use
Doctrine and Use of Another's Mark in Metatags, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1999, at C6 ("The
9th [sic] Circuit now has moved ahead of its sister circuits in recognizing that the
interplay between the Internet, e-commerce and intellectual property calls for new
types of analysis."). For a discussion of metatags, see infra note 67 and accompany-
ing text.
9. See RAYMOND A. KuRz, INTERNET AND THE LAw: LEGAL FUNDAMENTALS FOR
THE INTERNET USER 53-54 (1996) (stating that choosing trademarks must account
for legal availability of mark and scope of protection); see also Peter Brown, New
Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17 TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAw: THE
EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET-COMMERCE, FREE SPEECH, SECURIY, OBSCENITY, &
ENTERTAINMENT 1997, at 156 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 471, 1997) (discussing how in current Web
system, only one commercial entity may use particular domain name). For a dis-
cussion of the Web's inherent structural limitations, see infra notes 152-56 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the application of the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion to entertainment law, see infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
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This Note attempts to derive a method of analysis for future
Internet-related cases from the Brookfield decision. Section II de-
scribes the facts leading up to Brookfield's motion for a preliminary
injunction.10 Section III discusses the legal framework for trade-
mark infringement claims, including the Lanham Act's "likelihood
of confusion test" and recent adaptations by courts of the test to the
Web.11 Next, Section IV explains the Ninth Circuit's rationale sup-
porting its ruling in Brookfield.12 Section V critically analyzes the
Brookfield opinion within the context of the entertainment indus-
try.13 Finally, this Note focuses upon new legislation and domain
name registration policies that have been proposed and imple-
mented in the wake of Brookfield.14
II. FACTS
Brookfield featured two parties. The first, Brookfield Communi-
cations, Inc. ("Brookfield"), an entertainment-industry information
provider and computer software developer, initiated a suit for a pre-
liminary injunction. 15 The second, West Coast Entertainment Cor-
poration ("West Coast"), a nationwide video rental store chain,
allegedly infringed upon Brookfield's trademark rights. 16
10. For a discussion of the facts from Brookfield, see infra notes 15-33 and ac-
companying text.
11. For a discussion of the background law that preceded the decision, see
infra notes 34-88 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the court's analysis in Brookfield, see infra notes 89-127
and accompanying text.
13. For a critical analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 128-84 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of Brookfields impact on future regulation of the Web, see
infra notes 185-207 and accompanying text.
15. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that Brookfield markets computer software
targeting Hollywood film studios as well as individual consumers); see also Mans-
field &Jenal, supra note 8, at C3 (stating that Brookfield gathers and sells informa-
tion about entertainment industry); Brett Sporich, Virtual Video Stores, VIDEO STORE
MAG., July 18, 1999, at 18, 23 (stating that Brookfield's business is based in
Hollywood, CA). Brookfield creates and markets "MovieBuff" software, an In-
ternet-searchable, entertainment-industry database with information about "movie
credits, box office receipts, films in development, [and film] release sched-
ules . . . ." Mansfield & Jenal, supra note 8, at C3. National retail stores such as
Borders and The Writer's Computer Store distribute its software. See id. (indicat-
ing that Brookfield's business is not parochial).
16. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1056 (stating that West Coast's video store chain
competes with Brookfield's); see also Penny Arevalo, Ruling Tries to Tame Wilds of the
Internet: Court Offers Guidance on Trademarks and Metatags, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July
1999, at 36 (describing West Coast's chain as one based in Langhorne, PA); Greg
Miller & Davan Maharaj, Trademark Ploy is Banned on Net Computers: Firms Cannot
Falsely Lure Visitors to Web Sites, Appeals Court Rules, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at Al
(noting that West Coast is one of nation's largest video rental chains).
2000]
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Brookfield's trademark and service mark rights stemmed from
its 1994 registration of "MovieBuff' for its computer software with
the State of California and the federal Patent and Trademark Of-
fice.' 7 In 1991, West Coast federally registered "The Movie Buff's
Movie Store" as its trademark to promote its video rental business. 18
In conjunction with this use, West Coast obtained a Web site in
1996 at "moviebuff.com." 19 This effectively prohibited Brookfield
from later using its trademark as a Web address.20
Brookfield first became aware of West Coast's intent to launch
a searchable, movie-related database at "moviebuff.com" in October
1998.21 The site was also supposed to include the term "MovieBuff'
in its metatags.22 Brookfield believed such an Internet-related
database would be infringingly similar to its own "MovieBuff'
software. 23 On November 10, 1998, Brookfield sent West Coast a
17. See Susan J. Kohlmann et al., Mere Registration of Domain Name Not Consid-
ered Trademark Use; Lanham Act Requires Use of Mark to Acquire Rights, METRO. CORP.
COUNS., Aug. 1999, at 19 (stating that registration for software and Internet-search-
able database was granted to West Coast in Sept. 1998).
18. See id. (mentioning that West Coast's retail services featured video cas-
settes and video game cartridges); see also Mansfield & Jenal, supra note 8, at C3
(stating that "The Movie Buffs Music Store" derived from West Coast's earliest
advertisements in Massachusetts in 1988). Examples of such use included "The
Movie Buffs Gift Guide," "Calling All Movie Buffs!," "Good News Movie Buffs!,"
"Movie Buffs, Show Your Stuffl," "The Perfect Stocking Stuffer for the Movie
Buff.," "A Movie Buff's Top Ten," "The Movie Buff Discovery Program," "Movie
Buff Picks," "Movie Buff Series," "Movie Buff Selection Program," and "Movie Buff
Film Series." See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042 (listing West Coast's slogans which
included term "Movie Buff").
19. See Mansfield & Jenal, supra note 8, at C3 (stating that West Coast validly
registered domain name "moviebuff.com" with Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"),
one registrar of Web addresses).
20. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D. Il1. 1996)
(suggesting that practical effect of registering another's trademark as Web site en-
joins trademark owner from using mark as domain name on Web); see also Brown,
supra note 9, at 155 (stating that each domain name must be unique).
21. See Mansfield &Jenal, supra note 8, at C3 (noting that site would contain
searchable entertainment database similar to Brookfield's software).
22. See Tom Venetis, Setting Rules about Meta Tags [sic], 15 COMPUTER DEALER
NEWS, June 18, 1999, at 20 (stating that issue centered on whether West Coast
could use Brookfield's trademark in metatag). For a discussion of metatags, see
infra note 67 and accompanying text.
23. See U.S. Court Repudiates Web Ad Ploy, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 24,
1999), available at 1999 WL 8294043 (stating that Brookfield alleged infringement
because of metatag "bait-and-switch tactics"). Brookfield believed West Coast's
goals for its Web site too closely resembled Brookfield's own services provided
under the trademark, "MovieBuff." See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042-43 (grounding
Lanham Act claim in likelihood of confusion requirement); see also Kohlmann,
supra note 17, at 19 (noting Brookfield's claims that commercial online service
would constitute trademark infringement). For a discussion of the likelihood of
confusion test for Lanham Act claims, see infra notes 45-60 and accompanying
text.
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cease-and-desist letter in an attempt to convince the latter to forego
its use of the Web site.24 The next day, West Coast ignored Brook-
field's demand and issued a press release, affirming its intent to
launch the database at "moviebuff.com." 25 This refusal compelled
Brookfield to file suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. 26
At the onset of the litigation, Brookfield applied ex parte for a
temporary restraining order against West Coast in an attempt to
block the launch of the Web site. 27 The district court denied the
restraining order.28 Brookfield immediately appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.2 9 Meanwhile, West
Coast launched its Web site.30 This incited Brookfield to file an
emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, which the
Ninth Circuit granted.3 1
24. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (informing West Coast that site's use would violate
Brookfield's trademark rights).
25. See Arevalo, supra note 16, at 36 (noting that press release signified West
Coast's first use of "moviebuff.com" in commerce); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1042-43 (noting that site proposed inclusion of informational database and en-
tertainment-related merchandise); Brett Sporich, West Coast in Battle for Web Site
Name, VIDEO STORE MAG., Mar. 14, 1999, at 1, 42 (noting that Brookfield's com-
plaint alleged "'intent' to benefit from Brookfield's longer presence on the In-
ternet and that use of the name '[ ] created confusion' in the marketplace").
26. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043 (indicating Brookfield's immediate re-
sponse to West Coast's public statement); see also Mansfield &Jenal, supra note 8, at
C3 (stating allegations of trademark infringement and unfair competition in viola-
tion of Lanham Act (§§ 32 and 43(a), respectively)). Brookfield's amended com-
plaint also included similar claims under California state law as well as claims for
trademark dilution, but these were later waived on appeal by Brookfield. See Brook-
field, 174 F.3d at 1043 n.4, 1046 n.7 (noting that omission from opening brief con-
stituted waiver).
27. See Mansfield & Jenal, supra note 8, at C3 (stating that purpose was to
prevent West Coast from using "moviebuff.com"); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1043 (seeking to enjoin West Coast from using "MovieBuff" in its domain name
and metatags).
28. See Kohlmann, supra note 17, at 19 (noting that district court construed
motion as preliminary injunction); see also Mansfield & Jenal, supra note 8, at C3
(holding that West Coast was senior user of mark because it had used "The Movie
Buffs Movie Store" since 1986 and used "moviebuff.com" before Brookfield of-
fered its Internet version of MovieBuff).
29. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043 (indicating Brookfield's response to district
court's decision).
30. See Mansfield &Jenal, supra note 8, at C3 (noting that after district court
decision, West Coast launched its Web site); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043
(noting that site launch occurred on Jan. 16, 1999).
31. See Mansfield &Jenal, supra note 8, at C3 (noting that injunction prohibit-
ing West Coast's use of Web site and metatags remained in effect pending deci-
sion). To be entitled to a preliminary injunction in a trademark case, Brookfield
had to demonstrate either: "(1) a combination of probable success on the merits
and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) the existence of serious questions
2000]
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Brookfield was entitled
to a preliminary injunction and remanded the case for entry of that
judgment.32 In doing so, the court halted West Coast's use of the
Web site. 33
III. BACKGROUND
This section begins with an in-depth analysis of the Lanham
Act.3 4 It next delineates the Lanham Act's traditional likelihood of
confusion test.35 Then, it examines the application of the "fair use"
affirmative defense to a trademark infringement claim. 36 The sec-
tion concludes with a discussion of how courts have applied tradi-
tional trademark law to the Web.3 7
A. Lanham Act
Congress intended that the Lanham Act protect trademarks
and service marks used in commerce, and it specifically targeted
claims of infringement and unfair competition.3 8 Section 32 of the
Lanham Act provides specific protection against infringement to
going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in [its] favor."
Sardi's Rest. Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of
New York restaurant owner's request for preliminary injunction in attempt to stop
California restaurant owner's use of "Sardie's").
32. See Sporich, supra note 25, at 42 (stating that preliminary ruling "effec-
tively shut[ ] down West Coast's new e-commerce Web site, Moviebuff.com [sic].").
33. See id. (indicating that injunction would suspend "moviebuff.com" use);
see also Kohlmann, supra note 17, at 19 (indicating that because registration with
NSI did not in itself constitute first use and Brookfield was senior user, Brookfield
established superior trademark rights).
The Ninth Circuit later handed down a permanent injunction against West
Coast's use of the "MovieBuff" name. See Brett Sporich, West Coast Loses Moviebuff
[sic] Name, VIDEO STORE MA.,June 20, 1999, at 34, 34 (stating that grant of sum-
mary judgment against West Coast caused it to lose battle). To conclude the mat-
ter, the domain name was permanently transferred to Brookfield. See Brett
Sporich, "MovieBuff' Suit Costs West Coast, VIDEO SToRE MAG., Sept. 26, 1999, at 60,
60 (noting that in subsequent civil suit, Brookfield was awarded domain name and
$1.5 million for "willful misappropriation"); Merging Video Retailers Report Financial
Woes, VIDEO WEEK (Sept. 27, 1999), available at 1999 WL 7573823 (stating that jury
in civil suit found West Coast guilty of trademark infringement and unfair
competition).
34. For a discussion of the Lanham Act, see infra notes 38-44 and accompany-
ing text.
35. For a discussion of the likelihood of confusion test, see infra notes 45-60
and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the fair use defense, see infra notes 61-64 and accom-
panying text.
37. For a discussion of traditional trademark case law, see infra notes 65-88
and accompanying text.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996) (explaining scope of trademark protection).
Specifically, the Act seeks to:
[Vol. 7: p. 363
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registered trademarks.39 It also references a likelihood of confu-
sion test.40 Section 43(a) provides a remedy for unfair competition
claims. 41 This provision protects against a wide range of circum-
regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable
the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; . . . to
protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition;
[and] to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks ....
Id. The Act defines "trademark" to include:
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof - (1)
used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce and applies to register on the principal register ... , [-] to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown.
Id. Although this section of the Act also defines service mark, the Ninth Circuit
did not distinguish between the two in its analysis. See id. (assigning similar protec-
tion to services). Likewise, this Note also does not distinguish between trademarks
and service marks.
39. See id. § 1114(1) (referring to both trademarks and service marks ("marks")
registered with the Patent and Trademark Office). This section provides in perti-
nent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant -
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colora-
ble imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or ser-
vices on or in connection with such use is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.., shall be liable in a civil
action by the registrant ....
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
40. See id. § 1114(1) (pointing to non-specific likelihood of confusion test).
The test holds any person liable for the use of another's registered mark if the use
is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. See id. § 1114(1) (a)-(b) (refer-
ring to test without defining factors). The remedy as prescribed by the statute is an
injunction against the violator. See id. § 1114(2) (suspending infringing use). Sec-
tion 1114(2) (C) as amended in 1988 added a provision regarding "electronic com-
munication," but the statute does not clearly extend this to include the World
Wide Web. See id. § 1114(2)(C) (omitting reference to Internet); but see Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a) (9), reprinted in
1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat. 1501) 1536 (amending Lanham Act after Brookfield in
Nov. 1999 to refer to domain names and to limit liability of domain name registra-
tion authorities as codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (D)). For a discussion of the
post-Brookfield changes to the Lanham Act, see infra notes 195-199 and accompany-
ing text.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting false designations of origin and
false description). It states in pertinent part:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon-
2000]
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stances, including infringement of unregistered marks and false
designations of origin.42 Thus, trademark infringement and unfair
competition claims under the Lanham Act consist of three essential
elements: (1) the existence of a valid, protectible trademark; (2)
the use of goods and services in commerce; and (3) a likelihood of
confusion.43 The usual relief granted by a court is an injunction. 44
B. Likelihood of Confusion Balancing Test
The Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion test determines not
whether the public would confuse similar trademarks, but whether
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
42. See id. § 1125 (prescribing liability for misrepresentation as to origin of
goods or services). Similar to section 32 of the Lanham Act, this provision applies
a likelihood of confusion test to the offending mark. See id. § 1125 (a) (1) (A) (man-
dating test but omitting factors). The remedy for a violation of this provision also
includes civil liability. See id. § 1125(a)(1) (leaving out injunctive remedy from
§ 32 of Lanham Act). Although this Note does not discuss the issue, section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act additionally provides remedies for the claims of trademark dilu-
tion of famous marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (including eight part test for
determining whether mark is famous).
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act essentially provides the same protection for
unregistered trademarks as for registered marks under section 32 of the Lanham
Act. See KuRz, supra note 9, at 89 (analyzing § 43(a) of Lanham Act). For this
reason, courts have combined the analyses, and this Note follows their example.
43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) (a), 1125(a) (1) (A), 1127 (emphasizing three sim-
ilar requirements); see also Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43
F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]o prevail under [sections] 32(1) and 43(a) of
the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair competition, respectively,
a complainant must demonstrate that it has a valid, protectible trademark and that
the defendant's use of a colorable imitation of the trademark is likely to cause
confusion among consumers."); HENRY H. PERRTrrT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY 438 (1996) (stating that essentially same requirements must be sat-
isfied to qualify for protection as either unregistered or registered mark). Yet,
mere registration of a domain name does not constitute a commercial use. See
Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276,
1281 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying motion for preliminary injunction on ground that
there was no commercial use); see also Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting,
Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that reservation of "juno-
online.com" without more was not commercial use).
44. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) (explicitly prescribing in-junctive relief). Injunctions are also permitted under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) for vio-
lations of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). See id. § 1116(d) (reinforcing relief for
registered marks). In addition, under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), when there is a viola-
tion of a registered trademark right (as under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)) or of an unre-
gistered trademark (as under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), the plaintiff may be entitled to
recover: "(1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action." See id. § 1117(a) (providing alternative remedies in
unusual circumstances).
[Vol. 7: p. 363
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the customer of an accused mark would believe that the "trademark
owner sponsored, endorsed or was otherwise affiliated with the
product."45 As one court noted in Dreamwerks [sic] Production
Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio,46 " [i] n the usual infringement case, these
factors are applied to determine whether the junior user is palming
off its products as those of the senior user."47 Because the statute
does not delineate the test, courts have applied their own factors.48
Thus, the application of the test varies throughout the appellate
courts.
4 9
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.50 laid out one of the
earliest meaningful delineations of the likelihood of confusion
test.51 The court applied an eight-factor balancing test to deter-
mine the likelihood of confusion between two competing prod-
ucts. 52 These factors included:
45. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1993)
(applying seven factor likelihood of confusion test to alleged infringement of
trademarks and "swoosh" symbol).
46. 142 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1998).
47. Id. at 1129-30 (remanding for trial trademark infringement claim against
Steven Spielberg's DreamWorks movie studio by senior user of "Dreamwerks"
mark, sponsor of Star Trek conventions).
48. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that six factors were not distinct test but representative of factors to
consider in determining likelihood of confusion between Anheuser-Busch's regis-
tered trademarks and fictious advertisement for "Michelob Oily"); see also Freedom
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 1985) (using seven factor
likelihood of confusion test to determine no infringement existed between two
service marks, each employing term "Freedom"). Other courts define the test as a
balancing of "digits." See Amicus Communications, L.P. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
Inc., No. CIv. A.SA-98CA1176PMA, 1999 WL 495921, at *7 (W.D. Tex. June 11,
1999) (noting that Fifth Circuit precedent referred to factors as "digits").
49. See generally Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 775 (surveying six factors to deter-
mine existence of likelihood of confusion); Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 757 F.2d at
1186 (finding that evidence of actual confusion and type of mark were most impor-
tant of seven factors); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975)
(determining that actual confusion was not required to sustain infringement
claim).
50. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
51. See id. at 494 (dismissing Lanham Act claim by innovator of polarizing
material, electronic-optical devices and cameras against seller of television studio
equipment and microwave-generating devices after likelihood of confusion analy-
sis because of Polaroid's eleven-year delay in filing suit). The court hesitated be-
cause it was "by no means sure" that Polaroid "would not have been entitled to at
least some injunctive relief if it had moved with reasonable promptness." Id. at
496.
52. See id. at 495 (explaining that factors did not provide exhaustive list); see
also Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111,
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[(1)] the strength of [the prior owner's mark; (2)] the
degree of similarity between the two marks[; (3)] the
proximity of the products[; (4)] the likelihood that the
prior owner will bridge the gap[; (5)] actual confusion[;
(6)] the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting
its own mark[; (7)] the quality of [the] defendant's prod-
uct[; and (8)] the sophistication of the buyers.53
Other circuit courts have since used Polaroid to fashion their
own likelihood of confusion tests.54 While the analyses and number
of factors differ on a case-by-case basis, the balancing tests remain
similar and cohesive. 55 The Ninth Circuit in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats56 modified two of the Polaroid factors for its application of the
likelihood of confusion test.5 7 The Sixth Circuit first applied the
test to the Internet in Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc.,58
and it used factors similar to those from Polaroid and Sleekcraft.59
53. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
54. Compare Nike, Inc. v. 'Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir.
1993) (including parody as additional factor in likelihood of confusion test), with
Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1995)
(weighing actual confusion factor heavily).
55. A comparison of various circuits' tests proves that a differing number of
factors did not eliminate the tests' similarities. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying six factors for Eighth
Circuit's analysis), with Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir.
1975) (applying seven factors to find likelihood of confusion between two compet-
ing sewer cleaning services). Specifically, the seven factors applied by the Fifth
Circuit included "the type of trademark at issue[, the] similarity of [the] design[,
the] similarity of [the] product[s, the] identity of retail outlets and purchasers[,
the] identity of advertising media utilized[, the] defendant's intent[,] and actual
confusion." Id. at 45. The Eleventh Circuit later mirrored these factors in its own
likelihood of confusion analysis. See Freedom Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d
1176, 1182, 1187 (l1th Cir. 1985) (finding no infringement between unrelated
service marks).
56. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. See id. at 348-49 (providing recreational boat manufacturer plaintiff with
limited mandatory injunction against competitor's use of trademark "Sleekcraft"
for its line of high-speed, recreational boats). Sleekcrafl discussed eight factors:
"[(1) the] strength of the mark; [(2)] proximity of the goods; [(3)] similarity of
the marks; [(4)] evidence of actual confusion; [(5)] marketing channels used;
[ (6)] type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;
[(7)] defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and [(8)] likelihood of expansion
of the product lines." Id.
58. 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998).
59. See id. at 627 (remanding software company's case against consulting com-
pany because of inadequate application of likelihood of confusion test). The Sixth
Circuit cited its own precedent, but its likelihood of confusion test nevertheless
correlates with that of Polaroid and Sleekcraft. See id. at 624-25 (stating Sixth Cir-
cuit's factors); see also Sleekcrafl, 599 F.2d at 348-49 (listing identical factors); Polar-
oid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing similar
factors).
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The circuits also concur that the presence of all of the factors is not
required to determine the likelihood of confusion. 60
C. "Fair Use" Affirmative Defense
The Lanham Act provides a "fair use" affirmative defense by
which a competitor may avoid liability even if the use of a valid,
protectible mark creates a likelihood of confusion. 61 Under this de-
fense, if the mark was used in good faith to describe goods or ser-
vices or a geographic area, the use may not constitute
infringement.62 The three factors of the test for fair use are: "(a)
the product must be one not readily identifiable without the use of
the trademark... ; (b) only so much of the mark may be used as is
reasonably necessary; and (c) the user must do nothing in conjunc-
tion with the mark to suggest sponsorship or endorsement."63
Thus, courts must determine as a question of fact whether the
words are employed as descriptions rather than references to the
mark.64
60. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998)
("No one factor is dispositive, and a finding of a likelihood of confusion does not
even require a positive finding on a majority of these [factors] of confusion."); see
also New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979)
("Neither actual confusion nor intent are necessary to a finding of likelihood of
confusion under the Lanham Act.").
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988) (determining that type of use and
user's intent may shield user from liability); see also Washington Speakers Bureau,
Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 502 (E.D. Va. 1999), afjd, 217 F.3d
843 (4th Cir. 2000) (denying affirmative defense for lack of good faith).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (mandating when defense may be invoked).
Under this provision fair use prevents infringement when:
the use of the name, term or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a mark ... of a term or device which is descriptive
of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of such party, or their geographic origin ....
Id.; see also Washington Speakers, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 501-02 (holding that fair use did
not apply to competitor's deliberate use of "www.washingtonspeakers.com,"
"www.washington-speakers.com," "www.washingtonspeakers.net," and
"www.washington-speakers.net" as domain names).
63. Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Communications, Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
64. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058-59
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that with fair use defense, Ocean Spray's use of descrip-
tive terms sweet and tart to describe its cranapple juice did not infringe on Sun-
mark's "SweeTARTS" candies); see also Washington Speakers, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 502
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D. Modem Application of Traditional Trademark Law to the
World Wide Web
The Court of Appeals has only recently applied trademark law
to the Web; thus most case law exists in district court opinions.65
This Note addresses the holdings that pertain to domain names66
and metatags.67
65. See Hard Rock Cafe Int'l Inc. v. Morton, No. 97 Civ. 9483(RPP), 1999 WL
717995, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1999) (finding no infringement by owner of do-
main name "hardrock.com"); Shepard's Co. v. The Thomson Corp., No. C-3-99-
318, 1999 WL 777944, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 1999) (restraining defendant West
Group from using "Shepard's" trademark for online legal research services and
Web sites); McMaster-Carr Supply Co. v. Supply Depot, Inc., No. 98 C 1903, 1999
WL 417352, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1999) (finding personal jurisdiction in trade-
mark infringement suit against owner of"mcmastercar.com"); Playboy Enters. Inc.
v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221-22 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (granting
preliminary injunction for likelihood of confusion between "playboy" trademark
and "playmatelive.com" Web site).
66. "The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers,"
and each computer is identified through the use of domain names. See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (finding that provisions of Communications De-
cency Act aimed at protecting minors from indecent material on Internet violated
First Amendment). A domain name consists of a series of letters or numbers that
correlate to an assigned numerical code. See Leaffer, supra note 3, at 143 (stating
that Internet translates domain name into numbers in determining where to send
data packets). Domain names are usually comprised of two parts, a second-level
domain followed by a top-level domain name. See id. (noting that domain name
may also consist of third part, a country designation). The second-level domain
name features a term or series of terms by which a consumer identifies the site. See
Jason R. Berne, Comment, Court Intervention But Not in a Classic Form: A Survey of
Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1157, 1167 (1999) (describ-
ing second-level domain names as "user-friendly"). The top-level domain name is
the equivalent of a suffix and describes the nature of the enterprise. See F. LAw-
RENCE STREET, THE LAW OF THE INTERNET § 4-3, at 308 (1998) (indicating that top-
level domain names include ".com," ".edu," ".mil," ".net" and ".org.").
Domain names must be unique, and, in the United States, they must be ap-
proved through any one of the various competing "registries" who provide this
service. See NSI Press Release, Next Step in Evolution of Internet's Key Infrastructure
(Sept. 28, 1999), available at http://www.netsol.com/news/1999/pr_19990928.
html (announcing that twelve companies will share registration of ".com," ".net,"
and ".org"). These registries are connected by Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"),
the "registrar" with control over the main, root server of the Internet until Novem-
ber 2004. See id. (noting that under agreement with U.S. Department of Com-
merce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"),
NSI will continue to be accredited registrar). It should be noted that although
NSI's Internet control is global, other countries register domain names through
their own companies. See Sally M. Abel, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave
New Frontier, in UNDERSTANDING BASiC TRADEMARK LAw 1998, at 336 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 528,
1998) (mentioning that other registries all over the world may assign second level
domains). Thus, efforts have been made to unify the policy for domain name
registration on a global scale. For this discussion, see infra notes 200-07 and ac-
companying text.
67. Metatags are HTML codes used by search engines but are not visible to
users. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
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1. Domain Names Cases
Unlike the typical trademark dispute where both parties use a
term simultaneously and argue whether confusion exists, the cur-
rent configuration of the Web allows only one party to register the
term as its domain name.68 Thus, the party unable to register the
domain name of its choice usually brings the claim.69 The more
active district courts have decided on both sides of the issue, estab-
lishing that these Web-related claims must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. 70
In recent cases, district courts have employed relatively similar
likelihood of confusion tests. For example, in Washington Speakers
Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc.,71 a Virginia district court
held that the registration of "washingtonspeakers.com" was likely to
cause confusion with "Washington Speakers Bureau," the trade-
TITION, § 25:69 (4th ed. 1999) (stating that hidden code is trademark issue unique
to Internet). In an Internet search, the more frequently a site has the target
phrase in its metatags, the more likely the site will appear in the search results. See
Brett Sporich, West Coast Loses Web Site Name in Precedent-Setting Legal Case, VIDEO
STORE MAG., May 2, 1999, at 6, 6 (stating that search engines use metatags to locate
pertinent Web sites); Abel, supra note 66, at 381 ("Meta tagging [sic] is a technique
whereby a word . . . is inserted into the keywords field of the site in order to in-
crease the chances of a search engine returning the site, although the site may
have nothing to do with the inserted word.").
68. See Sporich, supra note 25, at 42 (quoting Eugene Volokh, "[W]ith the
Internet, there can be only one name, one domain name."); see also Intermatic Inc.
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (illustrating that plaintiff and
defendant could not both use "intermatic.com"). For a discussion of limitations
on domain name registration, see infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 580 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (holding that temporary restraining order was appropriate for assignee
of trademarks, "See's," "See's Candies," and "Famous Old Time" only if plaintiff
could obtain identity of owner of "seescandy.com"); Green Prods. Co. v. Indepen-
dence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (ordering
transfer of domain name, "greenproducts.com," to trademark owner during dura-
tion of litigation).
70. See Hard Rock Cafe Int'l Inc. v. Morton, No. 97 Civ. 9483(RPP), 1999 WL
717995, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1999) (holding that under Polaroid factors, Mor-
ton's use of "hardrock.com" constituted trademark infringement); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding that Has-
bro failed to demonstrate likelihood of confusion between computer consulting
company's Web site and its CLUE® game); Amicus Communications, L.P. v. Hew-
lett-Packard Co., Inc., No. Cry. A.SA-98CAl176PMA, 1999 WL 495921, at *16
(W.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that Hewlett-Packard's use of "PAVILION" product
name did not create sufficient likelihood of confusion to constitute infringement
upon Amicus' online communication services); Comp Exam'r Agency, Inc. v.Juris,
Inc., No. 96-0213, 1996 WL 376600, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996) (enjoining
defendant Juris from directly or indirectly using any variant of 'juris.com" as do-
main name because of likelihood of consumer confusion).
71. 33 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff'd, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000).
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mark of an agency firm that represents famous lecturers. 72 Like-
wise, in Green Products Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co.,73 after
performing the likelihood of confusion balancing test, a district
court in Iowa granted a preliminary injunction against a competitor
of Green Products Co. who registered "greenproducts.com. '' 74 In
comparison, Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Feinberg75 illustrated that the balanc-
ing test does not always produce a likelihood of confusion. 76 In this
instance, a New York district court held that the owner of the do-
main name "gunsrus.com" was not in competition with the chil-
dren's toy store, and its mark was not confusingly similar to the
Toys "R" Us mark. 77
Regarding the Court of Appeals, prior to Brookfield only the
Sixth Circuit had applied the likelihood of confusion test to a do-
main name. 78 In Data Concepts, the Sixth Circuit determined that
the registration of one company's trademark as another's domain
name could create a likelihood of confusion. 79
2. Metatags Cases
When metatags are at issue, the case does not remain a "stan-
dard trademark case and does not lend itself to the systematic appli-
cation" of the likelihood of confusion test.8 0 To adjust the test, the
courts shift their focus of the purchaser care factor from the tradi-
72. See id. at 501 (balancing likelihood of confusion test in favor of agent).
73. 992 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
74. See id. at 1079, 1082 (holding that use of domain name by competitor
would cause severe harm to trademark owner).
75. 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999).
At the time of publication, in an unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit vacated
the district court's grant of summary judgment against Toys "R" Us, Inc. for proce-
dural reasons and remanded the case for reconsideration of the likelihood of con-
fusion test.
76. See Toys "R" Us, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (holding that domain name was
not likely to be confused with "Toys 'R' Us").
77. See id. at 643 (finding that consumers would not be confused as to source
of defendant's products).
78. See Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 627 (6th
Cir. 1998) (finding that likelihood of confusion analysis revealed triable issue of
fact).
79. See id. at 627 (reversing summary judgment award and remanding for re-
consideration of likelihood of confusion test).
80. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(denying injunction because of fair use defense as to truthful use of "Playmate of
the Year" in metatags of Web site); see also Amicus Communications, L.P. v. Hew-
lett-Packard Co., Inc., No. Civ. A.SA-98Cl176PMA, 1999 WL 495921, at *14 (W.D.
Tex. June 11, 1999) (noting that confusion via metatags required separate analy-
sis); Abel, supra note 4, at 364 (noting that initial interest confusion leads courts to
view underlying trademark questions differently when metatags are at issue).
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tional likelihood of confusion analysis to an examination of "initial
interest confusion" by the consumer as to the origin of the mark.81
Initial interest confusion relates to the consumer's confusion as to
the origin of the particular mark.8 2
The Second Circuit developed the initial interest confusion
concept as a traditional trademark law application in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.83 In that case, the court found that an oil
trading company's use of "Pegasus" infringed upon Mobil Oil's
trademark, a red flying horse in the form of the mythological Pega-
sus.8 4 The Ninth Circuit later affirmed this modification to the like-
lihood of confusion test in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc.8 5 The Ninth Circuit found that the "capture [of] initial
consumer attention" might constitute trademark infringement.8 6
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.,8 7 the
court noted that "[i] nitial interest confusion,... is a brand of con-
fusion particularly applicable to the Internet."8 8 Thus, this inquiry
is relatively new in its application.
IV. NARRATIvE ANALYSIS
On appeal, the court in Brookfield focused its efforts on two
main issues under the Lanham Act: (A) whether the use of an-
other's trademark in a domain name constituted a colorable claim
for direct infringement; and (B) whether the use of that trademark
in the Web site's metatags also qualified as infringement.89
81. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.
2d 1070, 1082-83 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding no trademark infringement under ini-
tial interest confusion analysis for search engines' keying advertisements to Web
search of "playmate"); see also TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech
Co., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (applying similar initial interest
confusion test to infringing domain name, "teletech.com"). For a comparison of
the eight traditional likelihood of confusion factors, see supra notes 45-60 and ac-
companying text.
82. See Netscape, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (stating that Internet users may experi-
ence initial interest confusion when search results include Web sites other than
those sponsored by trademark holder).
83. 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987).
84. See id. at 255 (holding that redressable trademark injury existed because
potential purchasers would be misled by marks).
85. 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997).
86. See id. (noting that readers would be initially attracted to Penguin's The
Cat NOT in the Hat! book parody of O.J. Simpson's double murder trial, confusing
it with Dr. Seuss' trademark, The Cat in the Hat).
87. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
88. Id. at 1074.
89. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding trademark and metatag issues separately).
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A. Domain Names
The Lanham Act first required the Ninth Circuit to determine
whether Brookfield had a protectable trademark interest in the
term "MovieBuff."90 The court found Brookfield's federal trade-
mark registration supportive of a protectible interest presump-
tion.91 West Coast could rebut the presumption, however, by
proving it was the first to use the mark in commerce, or the "senior
user."92 This finding would also satisfy the Lanham Act's second
element, use of goods and services in commerce. 93
The court combined its analyses of these first two elements to
determine which company was the trademark's senior user.94 West
Coast unsuccessfully argued for seniority under a tacking theory.95
West Coast also claimed seniority with a first date of use argument,
namely that it started to use the domain name "moviebuff.com"
before Brookfield started to distribute its online database over the
90. For a discussion of the three essential elements of a Lanham Act claim for
trademark infringement and unfair competition, see supra note 43 and accompa-
nying text.
91. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047 (explaining that validity of Brookfield's
mark "MovieBuff" was established prima facie by registration with Patent and
Trademark Office); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (1988) (mandating
prima facie evidence of validity with federal registration); STREET, supra note 66,
§ 4-2(a), at 296 (1998) (noting that while registration is suggested, it does not
eliminate legal protection for trademarks). Registration of a mark, however, does
provide "constructive notice of trademark ownership against all other parties." Id.
92. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047 (ascribing "first use in commerce theory" to
"priority of use" and identifying right of senior user to enjoin junior user if marks
are confusingly similar); see also Sengoku Works, Ltd. v. RMC Int'l, Ltd., 96 F.3d
1217, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that standard test of trademark ownership is
priority of use and listing four ways to rebut presumption); New West Corp. v. NYM
Co. of Cal. Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1979) (deciding prior use of
"New West" trademark in favor of NYM Company because of first use in interstate
commerce). Thus, West Coast's seniority, if proven, would trump Brookfield's
mark and eliminate the claim for a preliminary injunction. For a discussion of the
two requirements for a preliminary injunction, see supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
93. For a discussion of the statute's use in commerce requirement, see supra
notes 38-39 & 41 and accompanying text.
94. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047-53 (comparing Brookfield's valid, pro-
tectible trademark argument with West Coast's first use in commerce argument).
95. See id. at 1047-48 (explaining that tacking encompasses trademark owner's
ability to claim priority in mark based upon previous constructive use of legally
equivalent mark or previous use of mark indistinguishable from mark in question);
see also Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (rejecting tacking argument with decision that trademarks, "CLOTHES
THAT WORK" and "CLOTHES THAT WORK FOR THE WORKYOU DO.," were
not legal equivalents). Hence, tacking claims are widely unsuccessful because of
the strict standard. See Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1160 (approving of tacking only
in rare circumstances).
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Internet.96 Nevertheless, focusing on the lack of similarities be-
tween the marks, the court rejected West Coast's tacking argu-
ment.9 7 It ultimately found Brookfield to be the commercial senior
user of "MovieBuff."9 8
After establishing Brookfield's valid trademark and West
Coast's use in commerce, the court looked to the third element of
the Lanham Act, a likelihood of confusion between Brookfield's
product and West Coast's use of "moviebuff.com."9 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, for the first time, applied the eight factor test, delineated in
AMFInc. v. Sleekcrafl Boats,10 0 to the Web. 10 1 Under the first factor,
the court examined the similarity of the conflicting marks, and de-
termined that "MovieBuff" and "moviebuff.com" were essentially
96. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1050 (finding trademark, "The Movie Buffs
Movie Store," and domain name, "moviebuff.com," irreconcilably different). The
court emphasized the Lanham Act's actual use in commerce requirement. See id.
at 1051-52 (characterizing West Coast's use as merely intent to use in commerce);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996) (defining "use in commerce" as "the bona fide use
of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right
in a mark."); Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d
350, 358 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that in absence of registration, prior use is estab-
lished only through genuine commercial transaction). The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that Brookfield's commercial use of the Internet began in either 1996 or
1997, and this trumped West Coast's commercial use of "moviebuff.com" which
began in 1998 with the issuance of its press release. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053
(holding that Brookfield was senior user).
97. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1049 (identifying differences between marks).
The court gave three reasons for the rejection of West Coast's similarity argument:
(1) the registered mark contained five words while the domain name combined
two; (2) the space and possessive were omitted in the domain name; and (3) the
domain name included ".com". See id. (determining that customers would not as-
sume marks to be identical).
98. See id. (holding that Brookfield marketed software well before West Coast
used "moviebuff.com" in commerce).
99. See id. at 1053, 1053 n.15 (stating that at preliminary injunction stage,
plaintiff must establish plausibility of likelihood of confusion showing); see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (mandating Lanham Act requirements for infringe-
ment of registered and unregistered marks); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6
F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The core element of trademark infringement is
the likelihood of confusion, i.e., whether the similarity of the marks is likely to
confuse customers about the source of the products."). For a discussion of the
three elements of a Lanham Act trademark infringement claim, see supra note 43
and accompanying text.
100. 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
101. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053-54 n.16 (focusing on three factors of bal-
ancing test: (1) similarity of marks; (2) relatedness of products or services; and (3)
marketing channels used). The court noted the flexibility of the balancing test
and mentioned the possibility of reaching a conclusion without thoroughly exam-
ining each factor individually. See id. at 1054 (cautioning that test is pliant); Fein-
gold, supra note 4, at S1O (emphasizing Ninth Circuit's warning against excessive
rigidity in application of test). For further information concerning the eight factor
test from Sleekcraft, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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identical in appearance, sound and meaning. 10 2 The second factor,
relatedness of the products and services offered, turned in favor of
Brookfield because the court concluded that Brookfield and West
Coast were competitors.103 Regarding the marketing channels for
the goods and services, both companies used the Web to advertise
and sell, and the court believed this use of media increased the
likelihood of confusion. 10 4 These three factors gave the court the
tentative conclusion that Brookfield had a strong case for the likeli-
hood of confusion argument.10 5
To complete the test, the court continued with the remaining
factors which it found less important.10 6 Under the fourth factor,
the court determined that "MovieBuff' was a "suggestive" trade-
102. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055 (stating that differences in capitalization
and addition of ".com" were inconsequential); see also Dreamwerks Prod. Group v.
SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding similarity in sight, sound
and meaning between "Dreamwerks" and "DreamWorks"); Sleekcrafi, 599 F.2d at
351-52 (concluding similarity of marks existed between marks, "Sleekcraft" and
"Slickcraft," on three levels: sight, sound and meaning).
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court erred in its comparison
of "moviebuff.com" to "moviebuffonline.com" because the Lanham Act required a
comparison of the allegedly infringing mark to the trademark. See Brookfield, 174
F.3d at 1055 (stating that comparison of domain names is inapplicable under Lan-
ham Act); see also Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107,
1110 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1161 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2000) (concluding
that domain name, "epix.com," and trademark, "EPIX," were same mark in In-
ternet context); Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36 F.
Supp. 2d 436, 439 (D. Mass. 1999) (comparing domain name, "energyplace.com,"
with trademark, "e NERGYplace" [sic] and finding them virtually identical).
103. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1056 (noting that if Brookfield and West Coast
had not been competitors, likelihood of confusion would be remote); see also Inter-
stellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (D. Or. 1997)
(finding use of advertisement for Rocky Horror Picture Show on Web not related
to trademark owner's computer equipment); Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The
Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (remanding for
reconsideration of whether golf clubs in Texas and Kentucky were directly compet-
ing or only somewhat related). The Ninth Circuit illustrated competition with the
fact that both entertainment companies competed for the same audience and both
provided online searchable databases with information about movies. See Brook-
field, 174 F.3d at 1056 (construing this to mean consuming public might likely
confuse West Coast's and Brookfield's products).
104. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057 (noting that use of Web exacerbates likeli-
hood of confusion); see also Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 304-05
(D.N.J. 1998), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that use on Web signaled
identical marketing channels); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that both parties' use of Internet
meant they vied for same market).
105. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058 (noting that remaining factors might favor
West Coast). The court focused on the previous three factors because it drew its
Sleekcraft factor application from an unreported case from a California district
court, Comp Exam'r Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc. See id. at 1054 n.16 (drawing its
analysis from California case law).
106. See id. at 1058-60 (stating that remaining factors were less determinate).
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mark and, therefore, normally entitled to less protection under the
Lanham Act.10 7 Under the fifth factor, the court analyzed West
Coast's intent in selecting "moviebuff.com." 08 It found the intent
factor indeterminate.10 9 Finally, the court focused on the remain-
ing three factors - evidence of actual confusion, likelihood of ex-
pansion in product lines, and purchaser care.110 It also found them
inconclusive. 1 ' Under the Sleekcraft test, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the district court erred; it held that Brookfield indeed
demonstrated a likelihood of confusion between its trademark and
West Coast's domain name while satisfying the three Lanham Act
elements. 112
B. Metatags
Having resolved the domain name infringement issue under its
new application of the Lanham Act, the court turned to whether it
should enjoin West Coast from using "moviebuff.com" in its
107. See id. at 1058 (stating that suggestive marks are weakly protected under
the Lanham Act). "A suggestive trademark sheds some light as to what the goods
are, but thought or imagination is needed to connect the meaning of the mark
with the goods." Kuaz, supra note 9, at 61; see also STREET, supra note 66, § 4-2(a),
at 296 (noting that this classification of mark suggests some quality about such
product or service). Furthermore, under the Lanham Act, suggestive terms gener-
ally have a narrow scope of protection. See KuRz, supra note 9, at 62-63 (indicating
that when one chooses suggestive mark as trademark, its protection becomes
limited).
108. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1059 (noting no principal intent by West Coast
to confuse customers). But see Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading
Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 500 (E.D. Va. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir.
2000) (concluding that Leading Authorities registered for domain names with bad
faith intent to confuse consumers).
109. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1059 (noting that when West Coast registered
"moviebuff.com" it was unaware of trademark rights in "MovieBuff' and that it
invested money in site long before Brookfield asserted trademark infringement).
Given the flexibility of the Sleekcraft factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that intent
did not affect the likelihood of confusion analysis. See id. at 1059-60 (indicating
that test favored Brookfield).
110. See id. at 1060 (noting that remaining factors did not affect balancing
test).
111. See id. (finding these three factors either irrelevant or unimportant). Ac-
tual confusion did not apply because Brookfield filed the action before West Coast
launched its Web site; likelihood of expansion of product lines was unimportant
because the parties were competitors. See id. (dismissing these two factors). Re-
garding the final factor, due care of purchaser, the court applied a reasonable
person standard of care. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1060 (noting that resolution of
this factor would not balance likelihood of confusion test in favor of West Coast).
112. See id. at 1061, 1066 (satisfying first criterion for preliminary injunction -
probable success on merits). For a discussion of the preliminary injunction crite-
ria, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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metatags." 3 Because the first two elements of a Lanham Act claim
were already satisfied, the court looked to the third element, the
likelihood of confusion test. The Ninth Circuit found the Sleekcraft
factors inapplicable and instead instituted an initial interest confu-
sion analysis for the metatag issue.' 1 4
To understand the application of initial interest confusion to
the Web, one must examine a common scenario: when conducting
a search on the Web, many consumers assume they can reach their
target site either by entering the name of the particular target fol-
lowed by a top-level domain name"1 5 or by entering the relevant
terms into a search engine. 116 Oftentimes, this retrieves a Web
page that does not belong to the target. Upon arrival at this incor-
rect Web page, confused customers might not realize that they had
reached another's site.' 17 Alternatively, they might mistakenly be-
lieve that the retrieved site was licensed from the target company's
site." 8 In either situation, the consumer might take advantage of
the services found at the retrieved site instead of continuing to
113. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061 (analyzing remainder of Brookfield's
trademark infringement and unfair competition claims). For a discussion of
metatags, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
114. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (explaining that disposing of issue under
traditional likelihood of confusion test would ignore confusion caused by Internet
context). The initial interest confusion test finds the equivalent of a likelihood of
confusion test in the situation where the results of an Internet search include Web
sites not sponsored by the trademark holder. See Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v.
EPIX, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1161 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 2000) (noting that purchase is not required to find initial interest confu-
sion); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.
2d 1070, 1082-83 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that initial interest confusion test ap-
plies in context of Internet searches using trademarks as search terms). The court
in Brookfield refused to apply the Sleekcraf analysis because to do so "would ignore
the fact that the likelihood of confusion in the domain name context resulted
largely from the associational confusion between West Coast's domain name
'moviebuff.com' and Brookfield's trademark 'MovieBuff.'" Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1062.
115. See Cardservice Int'l Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(stating that Cardservice International customers would expect to reach home
page by going to "cardservice.com"). For a discussion of top-level domain names,
see supra note 66.
116. See Nettis Envtl. Ltd. v. IWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (finding contempt for failure to promptly remove offending metatags from
search engines and perpetuating consumer confusion).
117. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (stating that Web surfers taken to West
Coast's site while looking for Brookfield's products will find similar database).
118. See id. at 1064 ("Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much
like posting a sign with another's trademark in front of one's store.")
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search for the target site."19 Even if a transaction does not occur,
the target company has lost its direct link to the customer. 120
Coined by the Ninth Circuit as applicable to the Internet,
other district courts have adopted this initial interest confusion doc-
trine as a standard for Web-related infringement claims under the
Lanham Act. 121 This is based on the premise that, as related to the
Web, only words are search terms; trademarks cannot be search
terms.122 Damage to the trademark owner, therefore, occurs in the
consumer's diversion from the target Web site.1 23
In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit held that the Lanham Act pro-
tected against this type of confusion.1 24 Thus, "the Lanham Act
bar[red] West Coast from including in its metatags any terms [that
might be] confusingly similar with Brookfield's mark."1 25 Although
West Coast was not prohibited from using appropriate descriptive
terms such as "motion picture enthusiast" in its metatags, its delib-
erate and intentional use of "MovieBuff' destroyed any possibility of
a fair use defense. 126
119. See Nettis, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 723-26 (noting that this kind of confusion was
not only hypothetical but actually did occur); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062(noting that diversion of people from intended Web site improperly benefited
competitor).
120. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.
2d 1070, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that diverted consumer may not continue
to search Web for initially intended destination).
121. See id. at 1074 (attributing initial interest confusion test to Brookfield); see
generally Netscape, 55 F. Supp. 2d, at 1083 (requiring higher showing of initial inter-
est confusion for First Amendment interests); Amicus Communications, L.P. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., Inc., No. Crv. A.SA-98CA1176PMA, 1999 WL 495921, at *14
(W.D. Tex. June 11, 1999) (requiring further investigation into confusion caused
by metatags).
122. See Netscape, 55 F. Supp. 2d, 1078-79 (indicating that "playboy" and "play-
mate" are simply words, not search terms). Thus, " [a] trademark holder may not
bar all use on the Internet of words in the English language." Id. at 1081.
123. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065 (holding that West Coast injured Brook-
field by affirmatively using Brookfield's trademark in its metatags). But cf
TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1414
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that brevity of initial interest confusion was not actiona-
ble under trademark laws).
124. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066-67 (granting preliminary injunction under
Lanham Act against infringing metatag use); see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Pen-
guin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing initial
interest confusion between parody and children's book trademark in purchaser
care analysis under Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion test); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that "initial
confusion works a sufficient trademark injury").
125. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065.
126. See id. at 1066 (holding that West Coast could only use "MovieBuff' to
describe its competitor's product). "MovieBuff' referred strictly to Brookfield's
software because the common English phrase is "movie buff;" "Movie Buff" re-
ferred to a "motion picture enthusiast." See id. (prohibiting West Coast from omit-
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Because West Coast's use of "moviebuff' in its domain name
and in its metatags infringed on Brookfield's registered trademark
under the Lanham Act, the circuit court instructed the district
court to enter the preliminary injunction barring West's Coast use
of "MovieBuff" on its Web site.127
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Brookfield delineated an inno-
vative application of Lanham Act claims to the developing World
Wide Web forum. 128 The court drew its analysis from district court
case law, 129 claiming to be the only circuit to address the issue of
trademark infringement via domain name use. 130 Despite this inac-
curate assertion, the reasoning from the Brookfield decision sup-
ported the Sixth Circuit's earlier approach to trademark law on the
Web in Data Concepts.13 1 Because Brookfield was only the second of
the circuits to address trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion in cyberspace, it set the stage for what potentially could be the
ting space between words "movie" and "buff"). For a discussion of the fair use
defense, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
127. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066 (stating that domain name registration
cannot trump long-established principles of trademark law). For a discussion of
the conclusion of the proceedings, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
128. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066-67 (resolving trademark law application to
Web). The court exerted substantial effort to ground the issues within the context
of the Internet and based its derivation in traditional trademark case law. See id. at
1044-66 (referring to Internet's structure and referencing traditional trademark
cases for likelihood of confusion tests).
129. See id. at 1061 n.22 (citing, for example, Washington Speakers Bureau,
Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Va. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 843
(4th Cir. 2000); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D.
Iowa 1997), and acknowledging that decision comported with many district court
opinions); see also Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Trademark Infringement and Dilution Up-
date, in UNDERSTANDING BAsic TRADEMARK LAw 1999, at 74 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 569, 1999)
(stating that before Brookfield, cyberspace trademark law was articulated only in
scattered lower court cases that were not controlling authority).
130. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061 n.22 (failing to mention Data Concepts ex-
cept in tacking discussion).
131. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 627 (6th
Cir. 1998) (analyzing possible trademark infringement claims under Lanham Act
by software company registered domain name that was registered trademark of
consulting firm). Brookfield cited Data Concepts in its discussion of tacking but did
not recognize that the earlier case could have been used as persuasive authority.
Compare Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623-27 (analyzing use in commerce and likeli-
hood of confusion test for domain name dispute under Lanham Act), with Brook-
field, 174 F.3d at 1048 (also analyzing use in commerce and likelihood of confusion
test for domain name under Lanham Act).
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precedent for a new brand of trademark law.132 One must assess,
however, the flaws which exist in the decision before making a strict
application of Brookfield in future cases.
A. Courts' Emerging Role in Regulation of the Internet
The Internet's rapid technological growth has compelled the
interpretation of traditional laws to adapt to this new electronic en-
vironment. 13 3 Brookfield embodied the Ninth Circuit's firm en-
trance into the digital world and further evidenced how the
Internet has affected society.134 Yet, in doing so, the court's intro-
ductory description of the Internet indicated that an Internet me-
dium would create a new spin on traditional trademark law. 135
Law before the Internet was different because trademarks and
competition were more parochial.1 36 In contrast, today, the In-
ternet connects people around the globe and permits instantane-
ous communication and advertising.1 37 Indeed, commerce may
occur on a twenty-four hour a day basis with a complete lack of
132. See Abel, supra note 4, at 366 (indicating that following Brookfield, polic-
ing in cyberspace must be grounded in traditional trademark law notions but also
must account for new avenues of consumer confusion); see also Mansfield &Jenal,
supra note 8, at C3 (stating that Ninth Circuit moved ahead of other circuit courts
by recognizing need for new type of Internet-based analysis).
133. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041 ("We must venture into cyberspace to de-
termine whether federal trademark and unfair competition laws... [apply to] the
domain name of [a] web [sic] site and in [a] web [sic] site's metatags."); see also
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (indicating that since its inception thirty
years ago, Internet use and technological power has mushroomed); WORLD INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET
DOMAIN NAME PROCESS 1, 1 2(i) (Apr. 30, 1999) (forthcoming Publication #92-805-
0779-6), available at http://ecommerce.wipo.int/domains/process/eng/
processhome.html [hereinafter Wipo] ("The Internet is something that increas-
ingly large numbers of people throughout the world find an interest in being con-
nected to. From 1990 to 1997, the estimated number of Internet users grew from
around one million to around 70 million.") (footnote omitted).
134. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041-42 (explaining consumers' use of domain
names and metatags).
135. See id. at 1044-45, 1062 (establishing basic understanding of Internet and
Web while disposing of Sleekcraf factors for metatag likelihood of confusion test).
136. See PERPur, supra note 43, § 10.14 (indicating that Internet has changed
scope of advertising and commerce). Without the Internet, there was less poten-
tial for consumer confusion because advertisements spanned more limited forms
of media, such as newspapers and signs, and later television and radio. In contrast,
the Internet created a global society with immediate access to goods and services at
its fingertips.
137. See Wipo, supra note 133, at 1 1 2(ii) (observing that Internet is populist
rather than elitist medium); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (1997) (stating that
Internet provides new medium of worldwide communication); STREET, supra note
66, at xxviii (relating that Web is most popular means of obtaining information
and receiving delivery of entertainment on Internet).
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human contact. 138 These technological developments potentially
lead to more severe trademark infringement injuries. 139 Tradi-
tional trademark law theorized that the number of possible trade-
marks was virtually unlimited. 140  While that idea remains,
trademark use is confined when applied to domain names and
metatags."4 Thus, Brookfield reassessed trademark law in relation to
the nature of today's society and the removal of traditional
boundaries. 142
B. Concordance between Brookfield and Data Concepts
The Brookfield approach implicitly concurred with the Sixth
Circuit's 1998 decision in Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting,
Inc.143 Like Brookfield, this earlier decision fielded a trademark in-
fringement claim based on the registration of the domain name
"dci.com."1 44 Both the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits addressed tack-
ing in the context of establishing senior use under the first element
of the Lanham Act.145 Regarding the second element, both courts
138. See STREET, supra note 66, § 1-1, at 2 (indicating vitality of Internet mar-
ketplace for consumer and business commercial transactions).
139. See Wu, supra note 4, at 1180 (indicating that in domain name context,
companies spend small fortunes to establish trademark in consumers' minds); see
also Sporich, supra note 33, at 60 (implying that regardless of investment, infringer
may lose rights to domain name).
140. See Kurz, supra note 9, at 53-54 (indicating that companies may choose
any terms and words as trademark, limited only by trademark's category of protec-
tion); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 156 (mentioning that in traditional trademark
environment, identical marks could exist in different markets); Wu, supra note 4,
at 1180 (stating that hundreds of different companies may have trademarks for
same word mark).
141. See Brown, supra note 9, at 156 (noting that on Web, only one commer-
cial domain name may exist per trademark). For a discussion of domain name
limitations, see infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
142. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999) (grounding discussion in current Internet
configuration).
143. Compare Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066 (recognizing trademark infringe-
ment under Lanham Act elements), with Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623-27 (apply-
ing Lanham Act elements to find existence of triable issue of fact).
144. See Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623-27 (discussing use in commerce and
likelihood of confusion test). Unlike Data Concepts, Brookfield added the additional
issue of metatags. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061-65 (analyzing buried code which
was not at issue in Data Concepts).
145. See Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623-24 (holding that Data Concepts was not
senior user of "DCI" mark); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047-50, 1053 (analyzing
extensive tacking case law and concluding West Coast could not tack prior use of
"The Movie Buff's Movie Store" to domain name). For a discussion of the first
element of Lanham Act claims, see supra note 43 and accompanying text. For a
specific discussion of tacking, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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established use in commerce and identified identical factors for the
third element. 146
Data Concepts, however, may be distinguished from Brookfield
because of the posture of the parties. 147 In the Sixth Circuit case,
Data Concepts, Inc. ("Data"), the owner of "dci.com," brought an
action against Digital Consulting, Inc. ("Digital"), the holder of the
trademark, "DCI," and Network Solutions, a registrar of domain
names, in an effort to secure its rights to its Web address.148 Data
attempted to preempt an infringement action by filing an action
for a declaratory judgment against the trademark holder.1 49 The
Ninth Circuit was unable to apply Data Concepts to its preliminary
injunction analysis because the Sixth Circuit did not complete its
likelihood of confusion analysis. 150 Instead, the Sixth Circuit re-
jected a summary judgment award and remanded the case. 151
C. Brookfields Incomplete Analysis
While the Ninth Circuit provided a lengthy and detailed opin-
ion, its analysis avoided or neglected three important issues regard-
ing the implications of its holding. These flaws could be significant
to future applications of Brookfield.
First, the Brookfield decision did not address the implications of
the inherent limitations imposed by the configuration of the World
Wide Web. 152 The two-tiered structure of the domain name creates
a problem because "on the Internet, only one entity may register
and use any given '.com' domain name."153 Furthermore, domain
146. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053-54 (applying eight Sleekcrafl factors); see
also Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623-27 (applying identical eight factors derived from
Sixth Circuit precedent).
147. Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 622-23 (indicating that Data Concepts sought
declaratory judgment of noninfringement).
148. See id. at 622 (noting that Data Concepts sought to protect use of unre-
gistered trademark as domain name from infringement claim by trademark
holder).
149. See id. at 622-23 (noting unsuccessful strategy because trademark holder,
Digital, countered with infringement action).
150. See id. at 627 (holding that analysis of likelihood of confusion factors
presented "too close a question to decide as a matter of law.").
151. See id. (remanding for consideration of likelihood of confusion test's tria-
ble issue of fact).
152. See Leaffer, supra note 3, at 144 (delineating restrictive qualities of alpha-
betical domain name compared to unlimited qualities of its assigned numerical
address).
153. Kimberly W. Alcantara, Trademarks in Cyberspace, in UNDERSTANDING BAsic
TRADEMARK LAw 1998, at 410 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 528, 1998).
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names are limited to a maximum number of characters. 15 4 Also,
they are assigned on a first come, first served basis. 15 5 Thus, when
more than one company owns a similar trademark, only one may
use it as a Web site address. 156
The Ninth Circuit did not view registration of domain names
as a complicated administrative enterprise with a finite number of
possibilities. 157 Instead, it focused on the infringement claim with-
out recognizing the limitations on West Coast's domain name
choices. 158 Although its approach was sufficient for the instant
case, the court could have explored a due diligence policy for the
registration of domain names. 59 Implementation of such a policy
could potentially reduce domain name disputes. Also, this type of
procedure might make it easier for smaller start-up companies to
avoid liability in cyberspace. 160
Second, although the court made clear that West Coast was not
permitted to use the term "MovieBuff' in the metatags of its Web
site, its authorization of West Coast's use of "Movie Buff' amounted
154. See Leaffer, supra note 3, at 144 (noting restriction of twenty-two charac-
ter limit of secondary-level domains).
155. See Abel, supra note 66, at 334 (referencing procedure for domain name
registration); see also Brunel, supra note 1, at 2-3 (declaring that domain names are
registered on a "first-come, first-served" basis and that companies may own more
than one domain name); Associated Press, Court Bars Suit Against Internet Name
Provider (Oct. 26, 1999), available at http://cnn.com/TECH/computing/9910/
26/internetnames.ap.index.html (referring to first come, first served nature of do-
main name registration).
156. See Ronald Abramson, Internet Domain Name Litigation, in ADVANCED SEMI-
NAR ON TRADEMARK LAw 1998, at 11 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Liter-
ary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 515, 1998) (stating that because of
uniqueness of domain names, litigation arises upon discovery of another's use of
desired domain name).
157. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044 (omitting discussion of Web's limitations);
see also Leaffer, supra note 3, at 144 (indicating irony of extensive virtual world as
related to its intrinsic limiting structure).
158. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047-62 (mentioning alternative domain name,
"westcoastvideo.com," without giving credence to West Coast's preference).
159. See Christopher P. Bussert, Acquisition and Sale of Intellectual Property, in
PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY ASSETS 1999, at 183 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 568, 1999)
(suggesting due diligence policy for registered trademarks would indicate poten-
tial infringement of third party). Such a procedure might eliminate disputes re-
garding registered trademarks, but it would not account for unregistered
trademarks vested with enforceable trademark rights. See KuRz, supra note 9, at 55
(indicating that unregistered trademarks would still present problem).
160. See Venetis, supra note 22, at 20 (stating that "smaller companies and
start[-]ups better be ready for a fight" regarding metatags). The same applies to
the fight over domain names. Yet, if a claim were brought against such a company,
the solution would involve a reliance on the fair use defense. For a discussion of
the fair use defense, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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to a distinction without a difference. 61 The court determined that
"MovieBuff," a word not in any English dictionary, referred exclu-
sively to Brookfield's goods and services. 162 In the alternative, the
Ninth Circuit held that as a colloquial expression, "Movie Buff' des-
ignated a "motion picture enthusiast" and that West Coast could
use either term.163 The court even gave an example of a permissi-
ble use of Brookfield's trademark - "Why pay for MovieBuff when
you can get the same thing here for FREE?"
164
Despite these lawful uses, the court did not address the possi-
bility that a Web search for "Movie Buff' would yield a variety of
results including both West Coast's and Brookfield's sites because
the space between the words may not be all that important to a
search engine. 165 Also, the opinion seemingly permits the use of
Brookfield's trademark in West Coast's metatags as long as it served
as a "reference to Brookfield's products."166 In this way, the court
did not conclusively resolve the metatag issue because either of
these uses could produce consumer confusion.
Third, the court in Brookfield relied on the initial interest analy-
sis in its earlier Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.'67
opinion.' 68 Dissimilar to Brookfield, Dr. Seuss primarily discussed
parody and copyright infringement.169 The Dr. Seuss court only
briefly reviewed the eight Sleekcrafi factors for the trademark in-
161. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066 (stating that West Coast could still use
"Movie Buff" but could not omit space between words).
162. See id. (indicating that one word trademark, "MovieBuff," solely referred
to Brookfield's product). The court appropriately noted that the use of
"moviebuff" in lowercase letters was off limits for West Coast's domain name. The
court, however, did not resolve the metatag issue as clearly. See id. at 1062 (discuss-
ing metatag issue).
163. See id. at 1066 (stating that correct general usage of term was in two word
form).
164. See STREET, supra note 66, § 4-2(c), at 302 (stating that query designed to
locate Web sites may generate hit list having Web site that does not contain infor-
mation about query).
165. Experience reveals that an Internet search compiles a vast list of sites
including those containing the search term as well as Web sites containing varia-
tions of the search term.
166. See STREET, supra note 66, § 4-2(c), at 302 (indicating that if West Coast
placed "MovieBuff' relative to Brookfield's competing software, search of
"MovieBuff" would yield both companies' Web sites).
167. 109 F.3d 1394, 1396-1403 (9th Cir. 1997).
168. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1062-66 (9th Cir. 1999) (deriving initial interest confusion analysis from
Ninth Circuit case law).
169. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1396-1403 (finding copyright infringement by par-
ody of "The Cat in the Hat" books under copyright law).
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fringement claim. 170 In fact, the only mention of initial interest
confusion in Dr. Seuss appeared in a single-sentence interpretation
of the degree of purchaser care factor. 171 Perhaps the Ninth Cir-
cuit wanted precedence for its inventive application of the Lanham
Act to metatags. 172 This approach, however, did not strengthen its
metatag opinion because the initial interest confusion test was
barely addressed in Dr. Seuss.
D. Significance of Brookfield for the Entertainment Industry
Trademark infringement has long been an issue for the en-
tertainment industry. 173  In fact, in Dreamwerks [sic] Production
Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio,174 a sponsor of science fiction conventions
that had previously registered the trademark, "Dreamwerks," sued
DreamWorks SKG, the famous film studio that produced "Amistad"
and "The Peacemaker," for trademark infringement. 175
As the realm of the Internet supplies new avenues by which
infringement claims under the Lanham Act may arise, Brookfield il-
lustrates that the entertainment industry will continue to be
targeted. 176 Following Brookfields holding, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
170. See id. at 1404 (concentrating on discussion of copyright infringement
and fair use defense). For a discussion of the eight factor likelihood of confusion
test from Sleekcrafi, see supra note 57.
171. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1405 ("[T]he use of the Cat's stove-pipe hat or the
confusingly similar title to capture initial consumer attention, even though no ac-
tual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion, may still be [trademark]
infringement.").
172. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065 (stating that conclusion was consistent
with Dr. Seuss). The court also examined the Second Circuit's Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp. decision and selected district court cases to show the pro-
gression of the initial interest confusion application to trademark law and then to
metatags. See id. at 1062-65 (inferring consistency with earlier case law).
173. See generally No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1381, 1383-
84 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (analyzing trademark infringement claim by sportswear manu-
facturer against motion picture producer's film title, "No Fear"); see also Elvis Pres-
ley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193-96 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing
infringement claim by assignee of Elvis Presley's estate's trademarks against use of
phrase, "The Velvet Elvis" by cigar bar in Texas); Baker v. Parris, 777 F. Supp. 299,
306 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing service mark infringement claim against singer of
musical group, "The Five Satins" by original lead singer of group with same name).
174. 142 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1998).
175. See id. at 1132 (holding that as junior user, DreamWorks should have
ensured its proposed trademark did not infringe on existing trademark rights).
Analogously, in Brookfleld, the Ninth Circuit noted that Brookfield could have noti-
fied West Coast sooner of the infringing use. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061 n.21
(choosing not to penalize Brookfield for delay).
176. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying Playboy's motion for preliminary
injunction against search engine operators for "keying" advertisements on Web
pages to user's entry of terms such as "playboy" and "playmate").
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Netscape Communications Corp.1 7 7 warned the industry that, in the
computer world, trademarked terms may not be afforded otherwise
presumed protection. 178 In this case, an adult entertainment pub-
lisher ("Playboy") instituted an action to enjoin Netscape and Ex-
cite, both Internet search engine operators, from using its
trademarks in conjunction with their own advertising. 179 The court
denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the use of "play-
boy" and "playmate" neither identified goods or services nor sug-
gested any affiliation with Playboy.180 It also concluded that, in this
case, the eight-factor likelihood of confusion test favored the search
engine operators.8 "
The message has become: when choosing a trademark in the
age of the latest technological advances, one must now give more
thought to its potential formulation as a domain name and subse-
quent use by others in metatags.1 82 The converse is also true.
Brookfield's "MovieBuff" provides a fine example of a non-English
word whose trademark protection was upheld.183 The court's clos-
ing comment from Dreamwerks rings true for the entire industry in
stating, "This dispute could have been avoided had DreamWorks
been more careful, or a tad more creative, in choosing its [trade-
marked] name."184
VI. IMPACT
The Brookfield decision illustrated how the World Wide Web re-
quires an adaptation of traditional trademark law. It also proved
that the Lanham Act, as written, did not fully accommodate these
177. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
178. See id. at 1090 (finding Playboy unable to establish required elements for
preliminary injunction).
179. See id. at 1077-78 (advertisements included "banner ad" at top and bot-
tom of Web page containing link to another's Web site).
180. See id. at 1079, 1085-86 (holding that Playboy had not met Lanham Act
requirements).
181. See id. at 1086 (finding no confusion as to source, sponsorship or
affiliation).
182. See Kuez, supra note 9, at 53-54 ("[W]hoever is involved in the creative
business aspect of choosing a trademark should take into account the legal aspects
of trademark selection, not only with respect to deciding upon the legal availability
of a mark, but also as to the inherent protectability and scope of protection which
may be afforded the mark that is selected.").
183. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066 (stating that "MovieBuff" only referred to
Brookfield's products and services).
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needs. 185 Thus, Brookfield fleshed out the likelihood of confusion
test's application to the Web and provided evidence that the Lan-
ham Act must be amended to include the Web. 186
A. Lanham Act Amendments in the Wake of Brookfield
Trademark disputes over domain names and metatags such as
those in Brookfield concern those at the center of Internet regula-
tion.' 87 In an attempt to solve such important commercial issues,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"), a non-profit California corporation, was formed to as-
sume responsibility for the administration of domain names and
other Internet-related functions. 188 ICANN, in conjunction with
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), focused
on implementing changes to domain name registration so as to pre-
vent disputes like that in Brookfield.189
In August 1999, only four months after the Brookfield analysis,
the United States Senate acknowledged inadequacies within the
Lanham Act and passed a bill known as the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("Act").190 This bill acknowledged, "if
someone is operating a web [sic] site under another brand owner's
trademark.... consumers bear a significant risk of being deceived
and defrauded, or at a minimum, confused."191 The Senate's find-
185. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 14 (1999) (proposing to amend Lanham Act
explicitly to provide trademark protection on Web).
186. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053-65 (delineating likelihood of confusion
test under Lanham Act and applying initial interest confusion test not included in
Lanham Act).
187. See STREET, supra note 66, § 4-3(b), at 311-15 (indicating that several or-
ganizations have proposed reforms for domain name registration).
188. See NSI Press Release, ICANN, U.S. Department of Commerce, and Network
Solutions, Inc., Announce Tentative Agreements on Future of Domain Name System (Sept.
28, 1999), available at http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-
pr28sept99.htm (recognizing ICANN's policy-making authority); see alsoJeri Claus-
ing, Internet Makes an Easy Target for Lobbyists and Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1999, at C1 (stating that ICANN's purpose is to set uniform, internationally-bind-
ing standards for Internet).
189. For a discussion of these new policies, see infra notes 200-04 and accom-
panying text.
190. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4. Its purpose clause states:
The purpose of the bill is to protect consumers and American businesses,
to promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the
law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive regis-
tration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to
profit from the goodwill associated with such marks - a practice com-
monly referred to as "cybersquatting."
Id.
191. Id. at 5. These trademark violations erode consumer confidence in
brand name identifiers as well as in electronic commerce. See id. at 4-6 (proposing
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ings specifically determined that using a domain name that is iden-
tical to or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark of
another placed unreasonable and overwhelming burdens on trade-
mark owners (such as Brookfield and West Coast) with regard to
the protection of their trademarks. 92 The United States House of
Representatives passed a similar bill in October 1999.193 Before be-
coming law, the Senate incorporated the language of the Act into
Title III of the broader Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999.194 The President signed the Act on
November 29, 1999, signifying that the Lanham Act must adapt to
deal with Internet-related trademark disputes.195
The Act makes three major changes to traditional trademark
law: (1) the addition of a definition of "domain name" to the Lan-
amendments to increase consumer confidence in Internet). Although the Act
takes aim primarily at "cybersquatting" and "cyberpiracy," which refer to situations
where a person registers another's trademark as a domain name either with the
intent to later sell it to the trademark owner or to divert customers from the mark
owner's site, its amendments to the Lanham Act render it pertinent to this Note's
discussion of trademark infringement and unfair competition. See id. (focusing
attention on cybersquatting).
192. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 1-2 (seeking to eliminate such burdens on
trademark holders).
193. See H. REP. No. 106-412, at 1-5 (1999) (proposing similar amendments to
Lanham Act under title, "Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act," with purpose of
allowing trademark owners to sue registrants of domain names). Although titled
differently, the bills' goals remain the same - "Both the House and Senate bills
outlaw 'bad-faith' registrations of Internet addresses, or domain names, that use
movie, book, or product titles or the names of large companies that might later be
interested in using those addresses to build an Internet presence." Jeri Clausing,
House Passes Measure on Internet Domain Names, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at C27.
194. See S. 1948, 106th Cong. § 3001-04 (1999) (enacted) (retaining title "An-
ticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act" and domain name trademark protec-
tion language from August 1999 bill). This bill included a motley of other
provisions including copyright license protection for satellite television broadcasts
as well as protection for inventors and their patents. See, e.g., S. 1948, 106th Cong.
§§ 1001-12, 4001, 4101-03 (1999) (requiring satellite carriers with secondary trans-
missions to air local market television broadcast signals byJan. 1, 2002 and grant-
ing inventors' rights against improper and deceptive promotion of inventions).
195. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
§ 1000(a) (9), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat. 1501) 1536 (incorporating
by reference Senate's Intellectual Property and Communication Omnibus Reform
Act of 1999); see also Michael D. Bednarek &John I. Stewart, Jr., Cyberpirates, beware,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at C20 (stating that instead of relying on inadequate
trademark law, companies may now obtain domain name forfeiture, cancellation,
or transfer from infringer); Phyllis Plitch, Bounty Hunter, New Law Puts Squeeze on
Net Domain-Name Cybersquatters, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 1999), available at 1999 WL-
WSJ 24926545 (stating that new law provides judges flexibility in determining bad
faith intent of domain name registrants); Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Cyberpirates Now
May Have to Walk the Plank: Suits Begin Under New Law that Outlaws Registering Others'
Marks and Names for Profit, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1999, at B18 ("Companies and indi-
viduals sending cease-and-desist letters to cybersquatters requesting that they vol-
untarily give up domain names now have a law to cite.").
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ham Act; (2) the limitation of liability of domain name registration
authorities under an amended section 32(2) of the Lanham Act;
and (3) the inclusion of a nine-factor balancing test regarding the
alleged infringer's bad faith intent as well as additional remedies
for the trademark owner under an amended section 43 of the Lan-
ham Act.196
Yet, while these additions to the Lanham Act make strides to
advance trademark law into the Internet age, they fail to resolve the
issues at hand.1 97 While focused on domain names, the Act does
not address the second issue from Brookfield, namely metatagsY98 In
this way, the likelihood of confusion test for trademarks cannot be
easily distinguished from the initial interest confusion test for
me tatags. 1 99
196. See S. 1948, 106th Cong. §§ 3001-10 (1999) (addressing Lanham Act
changes). The first change amends the definition section of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1127, to read, "The term 'domain name' means any alphanumeric desig-
nation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain
name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic
address on the Internet." Id. § 3005. The second change under an amendment to
15 U.S.C. § 1114(D) eliminates liability of registering authorities of domain names
so that they will not be liable for trademark infringement unless those authorities
acted with bad faith or knowledge of the infringement. See id. § 3004(2) (prevent-
ing virtually all claims against registries such as NSI). The third change to the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B), adds a nine factor bad-faith intent test to
consider: (1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights in the domain
name at issue; (2) the extent to which the domain name consisted of the legal
name of the person; (3) prior use of the domain name in connection with the
bona fide offering of goods and services; (4) legitimate noncommercial or fair use;
(5) an intent to divert consumers; (6) an offer to transfer or sell the domain name;
(7) registration of the domain name with false contact information; (8) registra-
tion of multiple domain names which were confusingly similar to the trademark;
and (9) the extent to which the mark is or is not distinctive and famous. See id.
§ 3002(a) (providing objective criteria for determination of otherwise subjective
"bad faith intent"). In addition, trademark owners may bring an in rem civil action
against an alleged infringer, and available remedies include a court order of "the
forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name
to the owner of the mark." Id.; see also Karen Kaplan, More On Tech: Clinton Signs
Cybersquatting Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at C3 (denoting that improperly-
intended domain name registration is now punishable with fines between $1,000
and $10,000).
197. See generally S. 1948, 106th Cong. § 3005 (1999) (for example, definition
of "domain name" does not define technical terms such as "registrar" and
"registry").
198. See id. (failing to mention metatag issue); see also Robert C. Scheinfeld &
Parker H. Bagley, Internet Update - Legislative and Case Law Developments, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 24, 1999, at 3 (arguing that metatag issue is unresolved by provisions of new
trademark law).
199. See S. 1948, 106th Cong. § 3002(a) (generalizing "confusingly similar"
without separating two analyses for likelihood of confusion and initial interest
confusion).
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B. Reformation of the Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
In its attempt to reform the domain name registration process
and avoid trademark infringement actions like Brookfield, ICANN
published a uniform dispute resolution policy, implementing
mandatory arbitration for domain name conflicts.2 0 0 This requires
people to represent that "to [their] knowledge, the registration of
the domain name [would] not infringe upon or otherwise violate
the rights of any third party" at the time of domain name
registration.2 01
After Brookfield, however, this provision would appear toothless
because at the time it registered the domain name
"moviebuff.com," West Coast was unaware of Brookfield's trade-
mark.20 2 Even ICANN has emphasized that despite this representa-
tion, it will not verify whether the domain name registration
infringes upon the rights of another. 20 3 Moreover, this type of arbi-
tration aims at avoiding litigation without firmly eliminating the
source of the problem. 20 4
C. Global Ramifications
As a dispute between two companies in the entertainment in-
dustry, Brookfield illustrated the cyberspace-trademark issue within
the United States. 20 5 Because the Internet is a global phenomenon
and the United States' Lanham Act does not bind the rest of the
world,20 6 ICANN's international policies are poised to play an im-
200. See generally ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION PoL_
icy, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter
ICANN POLICY] (implementing standard procedure for resolution of suits includ-
ing trademark infringement); see also Susan P. Crawford & Laura B. Kotanchik,
Domain Name Disputes, MONDAQ INT'L BRIEFING (Nov. 29, 1999), available at http://
www.mondaq.com (explaining ICANN's administrative procedure for domain
name disputes).
201. ICANN PoLICY, supra note 200, 1 2.
202. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that West Coast did not know about Brook-
field's trademark "MovieBuff" when it registered for "moviebuff.com").
203. See ICANN POLIcY, supra note 200, 1 2 (explicitly rejecting this responsi-
bility); see also Brunel, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that in registering new names,
there is no likelihood of confusion analysis applied to existing registrations).
204. See ICANN POLICY, supra note 200, 3 (providing remedies only for ex-
isting disputes).
205. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041-42 (discussing dispute between American
companies).
206. See STREET, supra note 66, § 4-2(b), at 299 ("Since the Internet is without
boundaries or territory and allows easy communication of potentially infringing
materials throughout the world, the affect of the Lanham Act on actions taken
outside the United States is an important issue.").
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portant role in further shaping American policies. Thus, it remains
to be seen what influence Brookfield and the subsequent changes to
the Lanham Act will have on trademark infringement and unfair
competition actions in the future.20 7
Melissa M. McGann
207. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066-67 (providing persuasive authority for sis-
ter circuits regarding domain name and metatag issues).
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